#### Internet Measurement Primer



Robert Beverly <u>rbeverly@nps.edu</u> NSDI 2020 February 24, 2020





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How many hosts are there on the Internet?

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Where is there congestion in the network?

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Where is there congestion '<sup>1</sup>' network?

What is the topology of the Internet?

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Hard! Lots we don't understand! Natural fit for experimental science





- Inform Internet evolution:
  - \* E.g., IPv6, DASH, QUIC, DNSSEC, IoT, and app du jour



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  - \* E.g., access, freedom, neutrality



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- Make the Internet better:
  - \* E.g., Security, resilience, accountability, privacy
- Inform policy:
  - \* E.g., access, freedom, neutrality
- \* Business + economics:
  - \* E.g., improve performance -> better user experience and / or more time for backend processing -> more revenue

# 

# y?

#### (major) hurdles community faces today?

\* Scale:

... there is much to measure



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  - ...and it's hard to get / not designed to be measured



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- \* Access:
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- \* Ground-truth:
  - ...and harder to validate inferences
- \* Reproducibility:
  - ...and best data and results are hoarded for privacy, policy, and self-serving reasons



RELENTLESS

FORWARD

PROGRESS

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  - \* Better idea of the network topology than ever before

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- \* Measurements that drive security (DNS, routing, etc)

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- \* Measurements that drive security (DNS, routing, etc)
- \* Variety of passive and active measurement platforms

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- \* Measurements that drive protocol improvements
- \* Measurements that drive security (DNS, routing, etc)
- \* Variety of passive and active measurement platforms
- Reproducibility and artifacts emphasis in ACM IMC, CCR

#### Techniques



### Techniques: Control Plane

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- \* Passive:
  - Looking glasses (RouteViews, RIPE RIS, etc)
  - Real-time and historic routing tables and update messages from hundreds of vantage points

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  - Real-time and historic routing tables and update messages from hundreds of vantage points
- \* Active:
  - \* PEERING
  - \* Participate in routing system, experiment

# Techniques: Control Plane Profiling BGP Serial Hijackers: Capturing Persistent

#### The Impact of Router Outages on the AS-level Internet

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#### ABSTRACT

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Misbehavior in the Global Routing Table

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Naval Postgraduate School rbeverly@nps.edu DUCTION

Neil Spring

University of Maryland

Internet anycast depends on inter-domain routing to direct

clients to their "closest" sites. Using data collected from a root DNS server for over a year (400M+ queries/day from

100+ sites), we characterize the load balancing and latency

performance of global anycast. Our analysis shows that site

loads are often unbalanced, and that most queries travel

Robert Beverly

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Internet Anycast: Performance, Problems, & Potential Dave Levin

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**1** INTRODUCTION

Anycast is one of the fundamental modes of communication, in which a set of anycast replicas all serve the same content under a shared identifier. In IP anycast in particular, server replicas at multiple geographic sites advertise the same IP address via BGP; clients are "routed" to a replica based on the underlying BGP routes; and from a client's perspective,

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#### Impact: Reliability Security Performance

Ints

Internet Anycast: Performance, Problems, & Potential

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  - \* Platforms: Ark, Atlas, scans.io, PlanetLab
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  - Regularly performed and archived (rich datasets)
- \* Passive:
  - Network telescopes, packet captures of subnetwork without hosts
  - No hosts = backscatter, scans, and misconfig = security insights
  - Archived captures from large telescopes





Denial-of-Service attacks have rapidly increased in terms of frequency and intensity, steadily becoming one of the biggest threats

to Internet stability and reliability. However, a rigorous comprehensive characterization of this nhenomenon and of countermea-

- \* Data:
  - \* Universities, colleagues, internships, partnerships
  - Crowdsourcing
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- Ground-truth and validation:
  - \* NANOG, R&E nets, providers, etc.





<u>Result:</u>

Creative ways to obtain better data Higher standard of validation Realism and realworld impact

I.com ACM Reference Format: Muthew Ludvic, Robert Beverly, Ryan Koga, M. and Regum Muthew Ludvic, Robert Beverly, Ryan Koga, M. and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Regum and k claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Argent and K claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Argent and K claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, Incentives, and Argent and K claffy, 2019. Network Hygiene, and Argent and K claffy, 2019. Networ

#### Greater than Sum of Parts

- \* Most research leverages <u>multiple</u> of these techniques
- \* Data <u>fusion</u> for insight and validation
- \* Huge value in <u>continuous</u>, archived measurements:
  - \* *Retroactive* understanding of important events

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- \* Measurement input/output in your own work:
  - \* Quality of input datasets for experimentation?
  - Skepticism of closed measurements ("believe us!")
  - Are you really measuring what you think you're measuring?
    ("Strategies for Sound Internet Measurement", Paxson 2004)
  - \* What (new) measurement techniques can you leverage?
  - \* Contribute output measurement data (and code) to the public?

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#### Thanks!

Questions / Discussion?

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